For Our Own Good?

Ernesto Garzón Valdés and the Limits of Government Paternalism

Der zweite Blick – A Second Look

During my studies at the University of Mainz in Germany, I met a man whose ideas have stayed with me to this day: the Argentine legal philosopher and political scientist Ernesto Garzón Valdés.

He was an unusual character. Even in summer, he wore a heavy wool coat, and he was a passionate cigarette smoker. At the time, I was a heavy smoker myself. This gave us plenty of opportunities to talk, both before lectures and on other occasions.

Having spent twelve years in the military, I was older than most of my fellow students. Perhaps our conversations benefited from my somewhat different background. In any case, I had the impression that he enjoyed our exchanges of ideas as much as I did.

One subject came up particularly often: paternalism.

When the Government Means Well

Put simply, paternalism means restricting someone’s freedom for what is supposedly their own good.

The government requires its citizens to behave in a particular way, not to protect others from them, but to protect them from the consequences of their own decisions.

This may seem perfectly reasonable. After all, there are many dangers against which we would be well advised to protect ourselves.

But does that give the government the right to force a competent adult to behave in a particular way for that person’s own benefit?

Garzón Valdés devoted considerable attention to this question.

His starting point was individual autonomy. As a general principle, every person must be free to decide how to live and what risks to take.

The fact that others consider those decisions unreasonable, dangerous, or wrong is not, by itself, sufficient justification for government intervention.

Garzón Valdés therefore searched for a convincing ethical justification for those exceptional circumstances in which paternalistic intervention might nevertheless be legitimate.

Basic Incompetence

He saw one such exception in situations where a person lacks the basic ability to protect their own interests adequately.

He used the term basic incompetence.

This may occur, for example, when someone is unaware of essential facts about their situation, when their ability to make decisions is seriously impaired, or when they are unable to pursue their own fundamental interests despite understanding what those interests are.

What matters is the specific situation.

A person may lack the necessary decision-making ability in one particular matter without being generally incapable of making decisions about their own life.

Above all, such incompetence must not simply be assumed. It must be established according to objective criteria.

And even that is not enough.

A paternalistic intervention must genuinely serve the interests of the person concerned and must aim to overcome the disadvantages resulting from their basic incompetence.

The identified impairment must not become a pretext for depriving someone of their autonomy in other areas of life.

Any intervention must remain strictly limited to what the specific incompetence justifies.

Under these narrow conditions, Garzón Valdés considered paternalistic intervention ethically justified and, in some circumstances, even morally required.

But the essential principle remains:

Individual autonomy is the rule. Any restriction of that autonomy requires special justification.

Mandatory Seat Belts – An Example

One example Garzón Valdés also used in our conversations was the legal requirement to wear a seat belt.

There is no question that seat belts can save lives. Wearing one is a sensible decision.

But does that automatically mean the government has the right to make it compulsory?

Garzón Valdés developed an interesting argument.

Suppose someone wants to protect their own life, understands how a seat belt works, could easily wear one, and yet chooses not to do so without any comprehensible reason.

There may be a contradiction between that person’s own objectives and their actual behavior.

Garzón Valdés regarded such a contradiction as a possible indication of basic incompetence and therefore as a potential justification for mandatory seat-belt laws.

This is open to debate.

After all, when is a decision merely unreasonable, and when does it genuinely demonstrate basic incompetence?

That question illustrates just how demanding the ethical justification of paternalistic government intervention really is.

It is not enough for a regulation to appear sensible.

We must also be able to explain why the government is entitled to enforce it against the wishes of the person concerned.

And Who Bears the Consequences?

Even back then, another argument was frequently made in favor of mandatory seat-belt laws.

Someone who behaves recklessly and suffers serious injuries as a result does not necessarily bear the consequences alone.

Health insurance, the healthcare system, and ultimately society as a whole may have to pay the resulting costs.

We discussed this argument as well.

Of course, individual behavior can have financial consequences for others.

But is that alone sufficient justification for government coercion?

If we accepted this argument as a general principle, almost any risky lifestyle could become subject to government regulation.

After all, the consequences of smoking, unhealthy diets, or dangerous recreational activities can also impose costs on society.

The argument about social costs is therefore not irrelevant.

But it is not sufficient as a blanket justification for restricting personal freedom.

A society based on solidarity shares the risks of life among its members.

That does not automatically give it the right to make every risky decision on their behalf.

And What About Smoking?

In his academic work, Garzón Valdés also examined the possibility of a general ban on smoking.

A smoker may be fully aware of the health risks and nevertheless consciously choose to smoke because the enjoyment is worth those risks.

Garzón Valdés explicitly tended to regard this as an autonomous decision rather than, in itself, evidence of basic incompetence.

The question changes when smoking harms other people.

Protecting third parties can provide an independent justification for government intervention.

This distinction is fundamental.

There is a difference between the government trying to protect me from myself and trying to prevent me from harming others.

An Idea That Stayed With Me

During my university years, these conversations were initially part of a fascinating exploration of political theory.

It was only later that I fully appreciated their significance.

In the following decades, particularly during my 24 years as mayor of a German municipality, I repeatedly encountered the question of where the limits of government intervention should lie.

Today, I have the impression that we have increasingly grown accustomed to governments interfering in our personal lives on the grounds that they are acting for our own good.

It often seems to me that we question the effectiveness of such interventions more readily than we question whether they are justified in the first place.

That is precisely why the ideas of Ernesto Garzón Valdés have lost none of their significance for me.

He opened my eyes to something important: a government measure may appear reasonable and serve a worthwhile purpose without necessarily being sufficiently justified.

Ernesto Garzón Valdés died in 2023 at the age of 96.

I remember an extraordinary scholar whose ability to explain complex philosophical questions briefly, clearly, and understandably impressed me deeply.

And I remember our conversations over cigarettes.

Above all, however, one question has stayed with me—a question that every responsible citizen and everyone exercising political authority should occasionally ask:

Is the fact that the government considers something good and right sufficient reason to impose it on its citizens?

Ernesto Garzón Valdés taught me why we should keep asking that question.

Source: Ernesto Garzón Valdés, “¿Es éticamente justificable el paternalismo jurídico?” (Is Legal Paternalism Ethically Justifiable?), Doxa 5 (1988), pp. 155–173.

Originally published in German on October 12, 2026.